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DIRECTOR CONFIDENTIALITY 
CYRIL MOSCOW* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Hewlett-Packard board-leak-investigation scandal in 2006 and the push 
for board representation by shareholder activists both focused attention on the 
obligation of directors to maintain the confidentiality of corporate information.1 
There is, however, sparse analysis of that aspect of director duties in American 
legal materials. The Corporate Directors Guidebook contains the bare 
proposition that “a director must keep confidential all matters involving the 
corporation that have not been disclosed to the public.”2 The Guidebook also 
provides the following supporting material: 
A director who improperly disclosed nonpublic information to persons outside the 
corporation could harm the corporation’s competitive position or damage investor 
relations and, if the information is material, could trigger personal liability as a tipper 
of inside information or cause the corporation to violate federal securities laws. 
Equally important, the unauthorized disclosure of nonpublic information by directors 
can damage the bond of trust between and among directors and management, 
discourage candid discussions, and jeopardize boardroom effectiveness and director 
collaboration.3 
This article explores the need to modify the flat recitation of a rule of 
director confidentiality in light of the limited authority for a blanket restriction, 
and the necessary exceptions in the business contexts in which the issue arises. 
In particular, many situations do not involve damage to the corporation, or 
there is express or implied consent to the sharing of information. 
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 1. James Stewart, The Kona Files, NEW YORKER, Feb. 19 & 26, 2007, at 152 (discussing the 
Hewlett-Packard investigation); see, e.g., Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Law 
Firm Clients on Boardroom Confidentiality (Sept. 26, 2006) (on file with author); Memorandum from 
Fried Frank to Law Firm Clients About Hewlett-Packard: A Caution for Company Directors (Sept. 28, 
2006) (on file with author); see Charles Nathan, Maintaining Board Confidentiality, THE HARVARD 
LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION (Jan. 23, 2010), http:// 
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/01/23maintaining-board-confidentiality (discussing directors 
nominated by shareholder activists); see also Viet Dinh, Dunn and Dusted, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2006, 
at A14.  
 2. COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S 
GUIDEBOOK (5th ed. 2007), reprinted in 62 BUS. LAW. 1479, 1500 (2007). 
 3. Id. The last sentence quoted was added in 2007, apparently in the aftermath of the Hewlett-
Packard scandal. 
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II 
SOURCES 
A.  Statutes 
A confidentiality requirement does not arise directly from statutory 
formulations. Section 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) 
describes the following director standard of conduct: 
(a) Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director, 
shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be 
in the best interests of the corporation. 
(b) The members of the board of directors . . . shall discharge their duties with the care 
that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar 
circumstances.4 
Most state statutes, notably excluding Delaware, contain similar 
formulations.5 The Official Comment to section 8.30 states that section 8.30(b) 
is often characterized as a duty of care and that “[s]ection 8.30(a) establishes the 
basic standards of conduct for all directors,” including a duty of loyalty.6 
Although there is no discussion in the Official Comment of a director’s duty of 
confidentiality to the corporation, section 8.30(c) does deal with director 
disclosures to the corporation’s board or a committee, and contains an 
exception to the obligation because of a “legally enforceable obligation of 
confidentiality.”7 Section 8.62(b) contains the same exception.8 The Official 
Comment to section 8.62(b) uses the example of “common directors who find 
themselves in the position of dual fiduciary obligations that clash.”9 
B.  Restatements  
Although corporate directors are neither trustees nor agents, there are 
sufficient similarities in the positions to allow references to the more-
established bodies of law in dealing with fiduciary duties of trustees and agents 
to use those principles in defining the obligations of corporate directors. 
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 78 states as to the duty of loyalty: 
(1) [A] trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the 
beneficiaries . . . . 
(2) . . . [T]he trustee is strictly prohibited from engaging in transactions that involve 
self-dealing or that otherwise involve or create a conflict between the trustee’s 
fiduciary duties and personal interests. 
. . . . 
 
 4. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)–(b) (2008). 
 5. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30, statutory comparison (4th ed. 2008). 
 6. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. 1–2 (2008). 
 7. Id. § 8.30(c). 
 8. Id. § 8.62(b). 
 9. Id. § 8.62(b) cmt. 2. 
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Additional General Comment: 
i. Associated duty of confidentiality. Incident to the duty of loyalty, but necessarily 
more flexible in its application, is the trustee’s duty to preserve the confidentiality and 
privacy of trust information from disclosure to third persons, except as required by law 
(e.g., rules of regulatory, supervisory, or taxing authorities) or as necessary or 
appropriate to proper administration of the trust. Thus, the trustee’s duty of loyalty 
carries with it a related duty to avoid unwarranted disclosure of information acquired 
as trustee whenever the trustee should know that the effect of disclosure would be 
detrimental to possible transactions involving the trust estate or otherwise to the 
interests of the beneficiaries.10 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides: 
Duties of Loyalty § 395. Using or Disclosing Confidential Information 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to 
communicate information confidentially given him by the principal . . . in competition 
with or to the injury of the principal, on his own account or on behalf of another . . . .11 
The Restatement (Third) of Agency states this obligation more simply: 
§ 8.05 Use of Principal’s Property; Use of Confidential Information 
An agent has a duty . . . (2) not to use or communicate confidential information of the 
principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party. 
. . . . 
For the standard applicable to directors and senior executives of a corporation, see 
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 504. 
. . . . 
Comment: 
c. Confidential information. Many employees and other agents are given access by the 
principal to information that the principal would not wish to be revealed or used, 
except as the principal directs. Such information may pertain to the principal’s 
business plans, personnel, nonpublic financial results, and operational practices, 
among a range of possibilities. The value of some types of confidential information is 
recognized by trade-secret law, which protects “any information that can be used in 
the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and 
secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”12 
The reference to the American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate 
Governance (Principles) leads to a pertinent formulation: 
a. General Rule. A director . . . may not use corporate property, material non-public 
corporate information, or corporate position to secure a pecuniary benefit, unless 
either: 
. . . . 
. . . (3) The use is solely of corporate information, and is not in connection with trading 
of the corporation’s securities, is not a use of proprietary information of the 
corporation, and does not harm the corporation; 
(4) The use . . . is authorized in advance or ratified by disinterested directors . . . .13 
 
 10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (2007). 
 11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958). 
 12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006). 
 13. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.04 (2005). 
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The Principles’ refinements as to the distinction between proprietary and 
nonproprietary information, harm to the corporation, and authorization point 
to the exceptions that are necessary to modify broad statements of director 
confidentiality. 
C.  Case Law 
1.  General 
There is little case authority dealing directly with a director’s duty to 
maintain the confidentiality of corporate information. As might be expected, 
most of the pertinent cases are in Delaware and vary according to context. In 
these cases, confidentiality is treated as part of a general duty of loyalty. For 
example, in Hollinger International, Inc. v. Black, the court held that the 
defendant violated his fiduciary duty of loyalty to the plaintiff because he 
“improperly us[ed] confidential information belonging to International to 
advance his own personal interests and not those of International, without 
authorization from his fellow directors.”14 
Similarly, in Venoco, Inc. v. Eson,15 the court found that directors misused 
confidential information. Upon considering its prior decisions, the court stated, 
“It is well-settled that directors ‘are not permitted to use their position of trust 
and confidence to further their private interests’ because the law ‘requires an 
undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation [and] demand that there shall 
be no conflict between duty and self-interest.’”16 
Finally, in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation,17 Vice Chancellor Strine 
quoted his earlier summarization of the rule dealing with insider trading, as 
follows: 
Delaware law has long held—see Brophy v. City Service, Inc.—that directors who 
misuse company information to profit at the expense of innocent buyers of their stock 
should disgorge their profits. This doctrine is not designed to punish inadvertence, but 
to police intentional misconduct. As then-Vice Chancellor Berger noted, Brophy is 
rooted in trust principles that provide “that, if a person in a confidential or fiduciary 
position, in breach of his duty, uses his knowledge to make a profit for himself, he is 
accountable for such profit.”18 
These Delaware cases and scattered cases in other jurisdictions indicate that 
material corporate information, like other corporate property, cannot be used 
for personal gain. 
A more complicated exposition of the duty to maintain corporate 
confidentiality arises when there is a conflicted duty to disclose the information. 
In Malone v. Brincat, the Delaware Supreme Court assumed a duty of 
confidentiality, stating, “The directors’ duty to disclose all available material 
 
 14. Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1061–62 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 15. Venoco, Inc. v. Eson, No. 19506-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 65, at *20 (Del. Ch. June 6, 2002). 
 16. Id. (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939)). 
 17. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 18. Id. at 933. 
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information in connection with a request for shareholder action must be 
balanced against its concomitant duty to protect the corporate enterprise, in 
particular, by keeping certain financial information confidential.”19 
2.  Director and Shareholder Inspection 
The most complete case analysis of corporate confidentiality is found in 
determining what limitations can be imposed on director and shareholder 
inspection rights. Faced with an inspection demand, corporations often seek to 
withhold some information as confidential or demand confidentiality 
agreements as a condition of inspection.20 In Disney v. Walt Disney Co.,21 the 
court noted that the Court of Chancery will often condition its judgment in 
section 220 cases on the entry of a reasonable confidentiality order, and stated 
that withholding of information in a confidentiality order could be overcome in 
connection with litigation.22 The Disney inspection situation is unusual because 
the information in dispute had previously been available to the plaintiff when 
he was a director of the corporation and the court relied heavily on the 
corporation director confidentiality policy that the plaintiff had approved.23 
In Holdgreiwe v. The Nostalgia Network, Inc., the plaintiff was a nominee of 
a major shareholder that was in a dispute with another shareholder in a struggle 
for control of the corporation.24 Plaintiff director made a demand for 
inspection.25 After rejecting the corporation’s claim that the demand was for an 
improper purpose, the Court of Chancery dealt with the request that the 
plaintiff be required to sign a confidentiality agreement.26 The court denied the 
request, stating, “He is already under an obligation to maintain the confidences 
of Nostalgia; to use its confidential information only to inform discussions 
among directors and action by the board or a committee. Disclosure of such 
information to AVI is a violation of duty whether or not an undertaking is 
entered.”27 
 
 19. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998) (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 89 (Del. 
1992)). 
 20. See Stephen A. Radin, Developments in the Law: The New Stage of Corporate Governance 
Litigation: Section 220 Demands—Reprise, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1287, 1388 (2006). 
 21. Disney v. Walt Disney Co., 857 A.2d 444 (Del. Ch. 2004); see generally Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, Twenty Years After Smith v. Van Gorkon: An Essay on the Limits of Civil Liability of 
Corporate Directors and the Role of Shareholder Inspection Rights, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 283 (2006) 
(discussing case). 
 22. Disney, 857 A.2d at 448. 
 23. Disney v. Walt Disney Co., No. 234-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 94, at *12–13 (Del Ch. June 20, 
2005). 
 24. Holdgreiwe v. The Nostalgia Network, Inc., No. 12914, 1993 WL 144604, at *329 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
29, 1993). 
 25. Id. at *328. 
 26. Id. at *336. 
 27. Id.  
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In contrast, at least as to sharing information with a sponsor, the court in 
Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs, Inc.28 held that a director representative of a fifty 
percent shareholder in a joint-venture corporation was entitled to inspect all the 
books and records without limitations. With respect to requests to prevent the 
sharing of the information with the fifty percent shareholder (WAG), the court 
stated: 
Nor is it reasonable to condition Kortum’s inspection upon an undertaking not to 
disclose to WAG any information gleaned from the document inspection. Kortum is a 
fiduciary of WSI, but he is a fiduciary of WAG as well. Absent a conflict between 
those two roles, Kortum’s fiduciary duty would require him to disclose that 
information to WAG, which is one of WSI’s 50% owners. . . . Magna has not 
established a conflict between Kortum’s two fiduciary roles.29 
The court went on to indicate that “it must be presumed that Kortum, as a 
fiduciary of WSI, will not disclose WSI’s proprietary or confidential information 
to such third parties. Therefore, Kortum is encouraged, but will not be required, 
to bind himself to that non-disclosure restriction.”30 In Kortum, the court relied 
on Henshaw v. American Cement Corp.,31 where the court stated that the 
director had shown a purpose germane to his position as a director and: 
His purpose is not improper because of the possibility that he may abuse his position 
as a director and make information available to persons hostile to the Corporation or 
otherwise not entitled to it. If Henshaw does violate his fiduciary duty in this regard, 
then the Corporation has its remedy in the courts.32 
D.  Commentators 
There is no comprehensive general discussion of director confidentiality in 
American legal texts.33 For example, a leading Delaware text contains the 
simple statement that “the duty of loyalty also requires that directors maintain 
the confidentiality of corporate information.”34 
 
 28. Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs, Inc., 769 A.2d 113 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 29. Id. at 121. 
 30. Id. at 121 n.17. 
 31. Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
 32. Id. at 129. 
 33. But see R.P. Austin, Representatives and Fiduciary Responsibilities—Notes on Nominee 
Directorships and Life Arrangements, 7 BOND L. REV. 19, 19 (1995): 
There is a perennial debate in the literature of company law about the duties of a “nominee” 
director. Discussion is particularly intense in Australia, New Zealand and Canada, possibly 
because in the relatively small business communities of those countries interlocking corporate 
relationships are more common than in, say, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
. . . . 
There are, however, some applications of the general fiduciary principles which may well have 
real and immediate practical consequences. They relate to corporate information. Is the 
company entitled to withhold information from a nominee director whose nominator is 
thought to be acting contrary to the company’s interests? When, if at all, can a nominee 
director pass on corporate information, acquired in the boardroom, to his or her nominator? 
 34. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE  LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.16, at 4-118. (3d ed. 2009 & Supp. 2010), reprinted in Nathan, 
supra note 1. 
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Law firm publications and blog postings supply some useful direct 
commentary. One 2010 firm newsletter distinguishes between company 
information and board information, such as the content of director discussions, 
and urges the use of policy statements that cover both categories.35 It also 
discusses the usually overlooked absence of legal remedies available to 
discipline directors who improperly disclose company information, even if there 
is a policy statement in place that would cover the situation.36 The presence of a 
policy statement, however, was important in the Disney shareholder inspection 
case.37 Since directors cannot remove other directors,38 in the absence of extreme 
circumstances that would support an injunction against disclosures, damages, or 
removal by shareholders or a court, the only formal remedy against an 
offending director is a refusal to renominate. 
A useful summary of confidentiality issues is contained in a 2008 article 
concerning “designated directors” as follows:  
What happens when the designating investor expects the designated director to report 
to the investor on non-public financial results, board discussions, potential corporate 
actions, and board decisions? On the one hand, the investor specifically sought board 
representation so that it could keep a watchful eye over its investment and receive 
exactly this type of report. On the other hand, the designated director has independent 
fiduciary duties to the corporation and all of its shareholders, which duties are usually 
understood to include a duty to maintain the confidences of the corporation. There is 
little law or commentary addressing this situation, but it appears that reporting to the 
investor should be permissible, as long as it does not harm the corporation or the 
other shareholders, is not prohibited by a specific corporate policy, and does not result 
in trading on inside information. 
Some of the uncertainty arises from the fact that there is no explicit source for a 
director’s duty of confidentiality. It is usually inferred from either the duty of care, the 
duty of loyalty, or both. Some corporations adopt a policy of confidentiality or a policy 
limiting those people who are allowed to speak to outsiders. If such policy is in writing 
and in sufficient detail, there is an explicit understanding among the directors and the 
investors as to the limits on disclosure. In many companies, particularly private 
companies, however, a confidentiality policy and its exact parameters, limits, and 
exceptions are not explicit or in writing. As a result, disputes may occur concerning 
how much or to whom a director may reveal information.39 
 
 35. Corp. Governance Comment on Board Confidentiality, CORP. GOVERNANCE COMMENT. 
(Latham & Watkins),   Dec. 2009, reprinted in Nathan, supra note 1. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Disney v. Walt Disney Co., No. 234-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 94, at *12–13 (Del. Ch. June 20, 
2005). 
 38. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 34, at 4-14. 
 39. David Morris, Lois Herzeca & Julie E. Kamps, Designated Directors and Designating Investors: 
Early Planning is Key, 16 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 5, 5 (May/June 2008) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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III 
ANALYSIS 
As indicated in the ALI Principles formulation,40 the necessary qualifications 
to a general rule of confidentiality are in the areas of materiality and consent. 
A.  Materiality 
 Not all nonpublic information about a corporation needs to be treated as 
confidential.41 Section 5.04 of the Principles42 suggests that only proprietary 
information, meaning trade secrets and similarly important information, needs 
protection. For example, a director usually can discuss corporate history or 
general business issues, even if the information is not easily available to the 
public. Therefore, a form of materiality qualifier is needed. Section 5.04 uses 
the phrase “material non-public information.”43 
Similarly, both the Restatement (Second) of Agency and Principles refer to 
misuse of information that causes injury to the corporation.44 It follows that 
there is no breach of duty by a director who discloses information unless the 
information is significant enough that its disclosure could cause some form of 
injury. The injury could either be the disclosure of proprietary information or a 
boardroom leak that causes embarrassment or director mistrust. 
B.  Consent 
After confidential information is defined to include only material 
information, the next question is whether the corporation has consented to its 
disclosure by the director. In many business situations, the corporation provides 
material corporate information to outsiders with the protection of a 
confidentiality agreement to prevent misuse. Financing and other business 
transactions require the furnishing of material information. Investment 
agreements with venture capitalists and other investors provide for information 
rights.45 Sometimes directors are authorized to speak for the corporation.46 As 
the Restatements of Agency provide, disclosing information with the consent of 
the corporation is not a breach of duty.47 Therefore, statements such as 
“fiduciary duties generally will trump contractual expectations in the corporate 
 
 40. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 13. 
 41. See Amalgamated Bank v. UICI, No. 884-N, 2005 WL 1377432, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. June 2, 2005) 
(“Ultimately, the question of whether a document is entitled to confidential treatment requires a 
balancing of various considerations within a specific context.”). 
 42. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 13. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See supra notes 11, 13 and accompanying text.  
 45. See, e.g., Michael J. Halloran et al., Investor Rights Agreement, in 1 VENTURE CAPITAL & 
PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION, 9–40 (2007 Supp.). 
 46. Ironically, it appears that the director at the center of the Hewlett-Packard board-leak 
controversy thought that he was authorized to speak to reporters. See Dinh, supra note 1. 
 47. See supra notes 11, 12 and accompanying text. 
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context”48 need some refinement to reflect consent. When there is consent by 
contract, fiduciary duty is modified and action taken pursuant to the consent is 
consistent with the director’s fiduciary duties. The qualifier “unless the 
corporation consents” should be imposed on statements of a duty of 
confidentiality. 
When there is no express consent, the ability of a director to share 
confidences depends on whether the consent can be implied by the 
circumstances. Close corporations provide the most important example of 
implied consent. It is generally understood that close corporations may be 
subject to different treatment of confidential information sharing than 
corporations with publicly traded securities. In the Kortum case discussed 
above,49 the chancery court recognized that a designee of a fifty percent 
shareholder in a joint-venture corporation was expected to provide information 
to the corporation he represented. More generally as to representative directors 
and the close corporation, a classic analysis of director conflicts of interest 
states: 
In making this analysis I will confine the discussion to the case of a publicly-held 
corporation. The problem of conflict of interest in a closely-held corporation may well 
be significantly different in many cases. For example, a particular director or directors 
may have been placed on the board, with the express understanding and consent of all 
concerned, for the purpose of representing the interest of one particular shareholder 
or group of shareholders. If that is true, then there is no reason why he should not do 
exactly that, even though theoretically he may not be acting disinterestedly for the 
welfare of all the shareholders as a group.50 
C.  Exceptions 
Beyond express and implied consent, there are other established exceptions 
to director confidentiality obligations. Indeed, the cases imposing 
confidentiality restrictions on information obtained pursuant to director 
inspection rights recognize that the information can be disclosed in litigation 
and in election contests.51 Under securities rules, when a director resigns 
because of a disagreement, the corporation must state the reasons for the 
 
 48. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? 
A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 774 (2008) (discussing the 
tension between contractual and fiduciary principles). 
 49. See Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs, Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 121 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 50. Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. 
LAW. 35, 58 (1966) (internal citations omitted); see Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 48, at 771–72 
(recognizing close-corporation difference with respect to constituent directors); Joseph Hinsey, The 
Constituency Director, THE HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. 
REGULATION (Jan. 14, 2008), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2008/01/14/the-constituency-
director; see also Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 89–90 (1992) (discussing disclosure to stockholders in 
close corporations). 
 51. See Disney v. Walt Disney Co., 857 A.2d 444, 448 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
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resignation; this might entail disclosure of otherwise confidential corporate or 
board information.52 
D.  Dual Directorships 
As indicated above, the MBCA recognizes that there are situations when a 
director may be prevented from making disclosures to other directors or 
shareholders of a corporation because he also is a director of another 
corporation.53 In this area, the cases and commentators sometimes refer to an 
undiminished fiduciary obligation to both corporations.54 The modifications of 
materiality, consent, and recusal in cases of conflict alleviate most concerns in 
this area. 
E.  Representative Directors 
Most difficulty concerning director duties in disclosure of information arises 
because a director is placed on the board to represent a corporate constituent. 
Several other issues concerning representative directors are more easily 
resolved: It is generally understood that representative directors should disclose 
their affiliation, will advocate the positions of their sponsor, and should recuse 
themselves in conflict situations.55 Representative directors necessarily have 
loyalty to their sponsors who might be preferred shareholders,56 controlling 
shareholders, joint venturers, family members, financial institutions, 
shareholder activists,57 government agencies, private-equity funds,58 venture 
capitalists,59 labor unions,60 directors elected through cumulative voting,61 or 
 
 52. SEC Form 8-K, Item 5.02(a); see Stewart, supra note 1 (discussing a disagreement over 
disclosures concerning a resigning director in the Hewlett-Packard investigation scandal). 
 53. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 54. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710–11 (Del. 1983); see also BALOTTI & 
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 34, at 4-148; I STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 811–16 
(2009). 
 55. See generally Cyril Moscow, The Representative Director Problem, INSIGHTS 12 (June 2002); 
Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 48; Hinsey, supra note 50. The terms representative director, 
constituent director, designated director, and nominee director are all used when a director is named to 
represent a shareholder or group of shareholders. 
 56. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 48. 
 57. See Nathan, supra note 1. 
 58. See Carole Schiffman, Current Issues for Private Equity Buyers, Ninth Annual Private Equity 
Forum, 1683 PLI/Corp 107, 119–20 (2008) (describing the suggested handling of confidential 
information by directors of portfolio companies). 
 59. Venture capitalists and other investors often obtain observer rights to avoid director 
obligations. See Ellen Corenswet & Sarah Reed, Venture Capital 2010: Nuts & Bolts, Introduction to 
Venture Capital Deal Terms, 1799 PLI/Corp. 35, 47 (2010): 
One or more investors may have the right to appoint an observer who, although not a Board 
member, will be entitled to attend all Board meetings and receive all materials, notices, etc. 
sent to the Board. Note that these individuals do not have fiduciary obligations to the 
company and, absent contractual terms, do not have confidentiality obligations with respect to 
the information they receive. 
 60. See Moscow, supra note 55, at 13–14. 
 61. See Hinsey, supra note 50. 
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other directors designated by persons other than corporate management. The 
issue is mitigated because many representative director confidentiality 
situations will fall within the express and implied consent exceptions described 
above. As an example of implied consent, it can be assumed that a 
representative of the U.S. Department of Treasury on a corporate board in 
connection with a federal investment will share financial information with his 
superiors, even if the investment agreement does not cover information 
transmittal. In addition, there are often express contract rights covering the 
providing of information and confidentiality agreements to prevent misuse of 
the information.62 Although it has been said that, at least in the public-
corporation area, the representative director ordinarily cannot be the “eyes and 
ears” of the sponsor,63 materiality and consent modifications will permit 
information transmittal to the sponsor in most situations. With respect to 
directors designated by a controlling shareholder, such as a parent corporation, 
the cases impose fiduciary duties on the controlling person, apparently in part 
under the reasonable assumption that a representative director will supply 
information to the parent corporation.64 
The greatest challenge is determining the confidentiality obligations of a 
representative director placed on the board without agreement through 
preferred-stock provisions, cumulative voting, or success in a proxy contest. In 
these situations, there is no contractual arrangement before the director is 
elected. Here again, the definitions and modifications described above come 
into play: To be restricted, (1) the information must fit the confidential category 
and (2) there must not be implied consent to information sharing because of the 
nature of the representation. It might even be argued that a director elected in a 
public corporation’s hostile proxy contest has obtained the implied consent of 
shareholders to the sharing of information with the sponsor. Importantly, if the 
materiality limitations in agency law are followed, there must be misuse of the 
information and some relation to injury to the corporation or its shareholders 
before a breach of duty is found. Moreover, when the representative director 
obtains appropriate safeguards, such as a confidentiality agreement executed by 
the sponsor, the corporation ordinarily would not be injured or have other 
grounds for an objection in the absence of a business conflict with the sponsor. 
As in most legal matters, when possible, advance planning and contract are 
the preferred remedies to potential conflicts. When these remedies are not 
available to deal with disclosure of information, the materiality of the 
information, based on the context in which it is being transmitted, should 
govern whether a director breached a duty to the corporation in transmitting 
the information to the sponsor. Statements of corporate policy that deal with 
confidentiality provide useful guidelines. They may, however, conflict with the 
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function of a representative director imposed upon a hostile management, as 
indicated in the following comment from counsel for shareholder activists: 
A common company policy, for example, requires directors to keep company 
information confidential, which may present an issue for a nominee proposed by, and 
especially one who is affiliated with, activist investors. An activist that achieves the 
election of its nominee to the board often does so on the basis that the nominee’s 
views will be more aligned with shareholder interests. The activist would like to be 
able to discuss company matters with that board member, at least to convey the 
activist’s views on the company’s conduct. The director will, of course, be required to 
act in accordance with his or her fiduciary duties and not on the instructions of the 
activist, and the activist, if privy to material non-public information about the 
company, would be restricted in trading (and typically would not want such 
information for that very reason). Discussions between the director and the activist 
would not make the information public, but might still violate company policy and, the 
company may argue, could even breach fiduciary duty.65 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The corporate statutes and cases do not establish a separate duty of 
confidentiality. The obligation of a corporate director to protect material 
corporate information is part of the overall duty to act reasonably in what the 
director believes are the corporation’s best interests, which includes the general 
categories of care and loyalty. Material information encompasses both 
proprietary information, such as trade secrets, and board information, such as 
the content of board discussions. As in most business situations, express 
contractual consent is the best solution to the problem of disclosure of 
information. Confidentiality agreements can establish boundaries for the 
transmission of information and prevent misuse. 
When there is no contractual consent, accepted business practices and 
expectations should prevail to establish implied consent. In close corporations, 
it is reasonable to assume implied consent to the communication to affiliates in 
most situations if there is no threatened misuse of the information. In both 
public and close corporations, it should be expected that directors representing 
a corporate constituency will share information with the sponsor when there is 
no conflict between the corporation and the sponsor. There are few formal 
remedies for breaches of the general confidentiality obligation or a corporate 
policy other than refusal to renominate a director. 
The most difficult contemporary issue is the election of a nominee of a 
shareholder activist to the board of directors as a result of a successful proxy 
contest. In that situation, there is no prior agreement with the nominee or 
sponsor, and the transmission of information might conflict with a company 
policy. A possible solution in this situation is to assume that information will be 
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transmitted to the sponsor and impose confidentiality obligations on the 
sponsor. A confidentiality agreement between the representative and sponsor 
would mitigate the risk of abuse. When there is a conflict between a sponsor 
and the corporation, the general rules applicable to director conflicts should 
apply to the representative director. In any event, the simple statement that a 
director must keep corporate information confidential requires modification for 
materiality, consent, and the realities of a particular business situation. 
